45th Agenda 

45th Session Issues

International Atomic Energy Agency

Introduction

In 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Japan and the era of nuclear proliferation began. From 1945 to 1962 four more nations joined the nuclear club and many others were on the threshold. To deal with the growing threat of nuclear annihilation, the countries of the United Nations came together to halt the spread of nuclear weapons technology. To combat the ever increasing use of nuclear technology, the United Nations created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is based in Vienna. Then in 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed and ratified by member nations and came into force in 1970. The purpose of both is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The NPT placed nuclear facilities under the authority of the previously created IAEA.

Background

The International Atomic Energy Agency came into being in 1957, and by the mid-1960s it had established a program of on-site inspections, audits, and inventory controls, the basic purpose of which is to deter the diversion of peaceful nuclear uses to military purposes by threat of early detection. To achieve its mission, the agency monitors the flow of material into and out of nuclear installations in member countries by auditing plant records and conducting physical inventories. Cameras and seals are used for monitoring when IAEA personnel are not present. Although the IAEA has never conclusively proved that materials were diverted from nuclear installations in any country, they have not been permitted to inspect all facilities.

The IAEA has no authority to inspect nuclear programs of nations which are not bound by treaty. In addition, the IAEA can only inspect those facilities that nations will allow it to inspect. According to the SIPRI Yearbook, the IAEA has never conducted a suspect site inspection, but would conduct such an inspection if it received intelligence information from member nations. However, the stand off between Iraqi officials and the IAEA regarding inspection of facilities after the Gulf War is a good example of what happens when the IAEA tries to conduct an inspection on facilities that a nation does not want inspected. Another factor to consider is the inability of the IAEA to inspect facilities of member nations that the countries have not put under IAEA auspices. For example Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and Pakistan all have installations that the IAEA is not allowed to inspect even though there are other installations that the IAEA does inspect within these nations.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors met in June of 1992 and authorized the first budget increase since 1984. Also, at the 1992 meeting the IAEA deferred discussion on the proposal to create a registry of nuclear-related transfers for the second time. A registry of nuclear material would work like the international conventional arms registry, which would enable organizations like the IAEA to keep track of transfers of material that nations could potentially use to create nuclear weapons. A registry would therefore make theft or diversion of nuclear material much less likely because it would be easier to detect. In addition to the IAEA, another very important part of nuclear non-proliferation attempts by the United Nations is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both the NPT and the IAEA form the backbone of the UN efforts to control nuclear technology.

The NPT came into force in 1970, creating an internationally binding treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The treaty calls for the existing nuclear powers to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by not assisting any nation in the creation of nuclear weapons. The treaty also calls upon non-nuclear member nations to pledge not to use peaceful nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. Of the five existing nuclear weapons nations in 1970 only three signed the NPT, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. China and France agreed to abide by the principles of the treaty but did not sign it. It was not until 1992 that all established nuclear weapons nations acceded to the NPT, China in March and France in August.

In the years following the ratification of the NPT, several other nations have achieved what could best be described as ambiguous nuclear status. According to Spector and Smith, India has exploded a "peaceful nuclear device," and Pakistan, South Africa and Israel either possess nuclear weapons or are close to possessing them (6). The problem with the NPT is that only the five original nuclear weapons nations, China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States are recognized nuclear powers. Even if nations like India detonate a device they cannot be considered nuclear powers under the NPT. This clause of the treaty creates a nuclear hierarchy, which leaves non-nuclear weapons nations at the bottom. Thus, nations perceive that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will strengthen their international status, resulting in an incentive to acquire nuclear weapons rather than as a deterrent.

The NPT calls for a conference to review its progress every five years and a conference at the end of twenty-five years to review and extend or dissolve the treaty. In 1995 the twenty-five year conference will be held and the effectiveness of the treaty will be evaluated. It will then be up to the committee to decide whether to extend the treaty as is, amend it, or dissolve it. With the 1993 announcement of North Korea's intent to withdraw from the NPT and the breakdown in negotiations between the United States and North Korea in early 1994 still fresh in the minds of conference delegates, it is likely that efforts will be made to strengthen the treaty and the inspections by the IAEA.

Current Issues

There are several issues that are very important in the current nuclear debate. After the Gulf War, the IAEA, under United Nations mandate, tried to inspect a nuclear facility in Iraq. The result was a stand off between inspectors and the Iraqi officials. In the end, officials did get to inspect the Iraqi nuclear facility, but the international community realized the impotence of the IAEA and the NPT. The United Nations realized how difficult the IAEA and the NPT are to enforce if a member nation refuses to accede to inspection.

After the Iraqi incident and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the focus of the international community in regards to non-proliferation has changed. Attention has turned from the previous spotlight on Western Europe, Canada, and Japan towards other nations, and the system must be adjusted to meet the changing needs of verification. At the center of the changing emphasis by the IAEA is the following question: "Are there possibly other Iraqs, that is, countries successfully hiding nuclear material that they should have declared and placed under international safeguards?"

Another current issue in the international non-proliferation debate is the potential nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the time of this writing, the stand-off between the United States and North Korea, regarding the latter's threatened withdrawal from the NPT, is at an end. The nations have signed an accord in Geneva, and North Korea is not leaving the NPT at this time. However, the threatened withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT has exposed one of the treaty's weaknesses.

The enforcement of the NPT is almost impossible at this time because all member nations have to do is to withdraw from it. Like most international treaties the NPT has an escape clause which enables nations to withdraw from the treaty by giving member nations and the United Nations Security Council notice of intent to withdraw and an explanation of the extraordinary events that have led to such a decision.

The threatened nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, also brings to the forefront the need to provide regional security assurances to help eliminate the need to arm. The Korean Peninsula like the Indian Subcontinent, is characterized by hostile relations between the nations that share borders. The South and North Koreans have an adversarial relationship as do the Pakistanis and the Indians, which offer incentive for those nations to have nuclear weapons as security. Then once one nation acquires weapons the other must have one.

Take for example, the hostile relationship that exists between India and Pakistan. Once India made a nuclear device to maintain weapons superiority over enemy state Pakistan, the Pakistanis vowed to have one of their own. As one government official stated "We will eat leaves and grass, even go hungry, but we will have one of our own". The only way to eliminate proliferation in cases like India and Pakistan or North and South Korea is to use the United Nations to work towards creating regional security assurances to eliminate this incentive to nuclearize.

Not only is the current nuclear debate centering on how to strengthen penalties for noncompliance with IAEA safeguards, but it has also been recommended that the number of personnel and financial resources available to the agency be increased. By increasing the resources available to the agency, it will have more money and people to conduct more inspections. Conducting more inspections, will make diversion of materials more risky to proliferators. Also, the inspections need to be modified to increase the quality of inspections, not just the quantity.

If the inspections are done less thoroughly, then the increase in number will not matter. In regards to the inspections that the IAEA carries out on facilities, another suggestion that has come out is the use of surprise inspections like those used in Iraq after the Gulf War. The surprise inspection does not allow time for the hiding of illegal activities and the careful cover-up necessary to hide a country's nuclear weapons ambitions.

In addition to an increase in human and capital resources, the IAEA needs to have broader access to intelligence data regarding suspect nations. Member nations need to be encouraged to share with the IAEA their intelligence data on suspect facilities, so that it can establish an early warning of such activity.

As mentioned above, the IAEA is also considering the creation of a registry of nuclear-related transfers. This registry would function like the newly created international arms registry and would help the IAEA track shipments of materials that could potentially be used to create nuclear weapons grade material to occur.

As the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference approaches, there is new attention being focused on the very real threat that the nuclear nightmare is not over. Now rather than worrying about an East - West conflict, the real nuclear nightmare that has been there all along is getting attention: the threat of a small nation gaining nuclear weapons and having a regional conflict resulting in a nuclear exchange. Imagine the current war in the former Yugoslavia being fought with nuclear warheads.

Questions

1. Should the NPT be amended to include stronger enforcement mechanisms for nations found to be in violation of the treaty?
2. If so what mechanisms should be used? Sanctions? What else?
3. How can the United Nations strengthen the NPT and expand IAEA powers if nations are free to withdraw at any time so long as they give notice of intent?
4. How can the IAEA force a nation to allow its facilities to be inspected?

Sources

Blix, Hans. "Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation; the lesson of Iraq," Wilson Quarterly. Autumn 1992, 57-59, 61-62.

Broad, William J. "Nuclear Fears; plan to limit Atomic Material," New York Times. 21 August, 1994, A1.

Ekeus, Rolf. "The Iraqi Experience and feature of Nuclear Non-Proliferation," Wilson Quarterly. Autumn1992, 69.